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Introduction
For immigrants, naturalization can be described as a last stepping stone of settling in in their host country. Granting and receiving citizenship are not solely symbolic acts.
Citizenship irreversibly opens the gate to a nation's political and territorial association.
Citizens can vote and have an inde…nite right of stay. Citizenship also often comes with higher wages and improved access to the labor market (Fougère and Sa…, 2009 ). The bene…ts of citizenship are not restricted to the naturalized; there is also evidence that naturalizations may improve the policital and social integration of immigrants (Steinhardt, 2012; Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantuono, 2015) . Naturalizations thus have the potential to a¤ect a myriad of political, social, and economic settings in host countries.
That potential is especially palpable in Europe, Northern America, and Oceania, where every tenth resident was not born where they live (United Nations, 2016).
Whenever minorities are at such mercy of decisionmakers, disputes about prejudice tend to crop up: housing, jobs, policing, and the justice system are just a few examples. The concern in naturalizations is whether the eligibility of marginalized applicants striving for citizenship is measured by the same yardstick. However, despite the gravitas of the decision, not much is known about systematic prejudice in granting citizenships.
This contrasts with a well-established literature on discrimination in other arenas.
1 But 1 The following attempt gives a tiny glimpe into the literature. Unless otherwise noted, the cited studies investigate data from the United States. For discrimination in housing, see Zhao, Ondrich and Yinger (2006) , who focus on real estate brokers, and the study by Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) for Sweden's rental market. A comprehensive recent study by Ewens, Tomlin and Wang (2014) pinpoints to statistical discrimination rather than taste-based discrimination in the rental appartment market. For surveys about ethnic discrimination in labor markets, see Neumark (2013) and Lang and Lehmann (2012) . Research on discrimination in policing spans from the seminal paper by Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) until a very recent and controversial study by Fryer (2016) on police violence. Ayres and Waldfogel (1994) present early evidence for discrimination at the bail bond setting stage, and Alesina and La Ferrara (2014) reject the hypothesis of no prejudice in capital sentencing. Shayo and Zussman (2011) present evidence for judicial ingroup bias in Israel. Rich data is key in empirical analyses: More evidence on discrimination comes from experiments selling iPods in local online classi…ed advertisements (Doleac and Stein, 2013) and from a job market …eld experiment that implemented changes in the cost of discrimination during required collaborations (Heddegaard and Tyran, 2016) . Sports provide excellent data: Price and Wolfers (2010) study racial discrimination among basketball referees in the NBA, and Parsons et al. (2011) study prejudice among baseball umpires in the MLB.
there is no reason to expect that naturalizations are immune to prejudice, nor is there a lack of controversy. For example, an ongoing lawsuit by Muslim applicants in the United States raises complaints against Immigration Services.
2 This is just the latest tip of the iceberg. There has been a wave of lawsuits related to naturalizations in the United States in the last ten years. 3 In Germany, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed its discomfort with application questions biased against
Muslim applicants (CERD, 2008) . In Switzerland, applicants from Turkey and former Yugoslavia, both minority groups, have long been suspected to be at a disadvantage by sometimes being rejected at will (Helbling, 2008 ). Yet more controversy could be looming. Within the scope of its immigration reform, the US government has proposed to provide a path to citizenship for its 11 million undocumented workers (The White House,
O¢ ce of the Press Secretary, 2013).
One reason for the dearth of research on prejudice in naturalizations is scant empirical data. Countries usually only publish aggregate data of granted citizenships, at best strati…ed by country of origin. Unravelling prejudice, however, requires more data. Lower naturalization rates or higher rejection rates for certain groups, for instance, may have many accountable causes. For one, marginalized groups tend to face larger socio-economic disadvantages, so it is conceivable that they are less likely to be eligible and would fail to meet naturalization standards more often than other applicant groups. Accounting for such di¤erences in patterns of eligibility is key if one wants to test rigorously for prejudice. With rich microlevel data one could attribute di¤erences in naturalization outcomes to the e¤ects of di¤erences in measured applicant characteristics. Not all these characteristics, however, are usually observable to researchers.
An exception that managed to pursue this very strategy is the study by Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) The model adds to the ongoing research on modeled outcome tests of discrimination, which originates back to Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) . In their paper, police o¢ cers and motorists strategically interact in the context of motor vehicle searches. To test prejudice among the police, Knowles, Persico, and Todd compare the search success rates of white, black, and Hispanic motorists. Anwar and Fang (2006) generalize that seminal model and drop two key assumptions; the requirement that motorists respond to the probability of being searched and the assumption of a monolithic police force.
Discrimination in healthcare is the subjet in Anwar and Fang (2013) , who investigate error patterns in emergency room visit discharges. In their model, physisians have to decide whether to keep emergency room patients in the hospital for further investigation or whether to send them home. The test for prejudice against patients of di¤erent races relies on the comparison of their bounce back rates -the probability that a patient had been misdiagnosed and needed to revisit an emergency room shortly after being mistakenly discharged. Parole release data have also been exploited in modeled outcome tests. Mechoulan and Sahuguet (2015) and Anwar and Fang (2015) put forth models to test for prejudice using rates of recidivism grouped by prisoner race. Finally, Alesina and 5 La Ferrara (2014) Section 5 discusses and concludes.
Naturalization Policies Around the World
In countries that do not follow the ius soli principle, obtaining citizenship usually requires an active engagement even on the part of those immigrants that were born in their host countries. Naturalization procedures are country-speci…c, and these policies vary in strictness. For instance, in the European Union, despite attaining corresponding rights in all member states upon naturalization, policies range from actively promoting naturalization to restrictive access. These degrees are not cast in stone but change over time, again depending on the country (Bauböck et al., 2006) . Whereas Belgium and Germany have strived for more liberal practices in the recent past, Greece and
Italy have adopted increasingly conservative attitudes. This cross-sectional variation in strictness is not con…ned to the country level. Helbling (2010) shows that within countries, naturalization rates and the strictness of the interpretation of the national citizenship laws di¤er greatly among administrative divisions. In Germany, this holds true at the Länder level (Dornis, 2001; Hagedorn, 2001; Hailbronner, 2006) . Austria, too, shows variations at its regional level (Cinar and Waldrauch, 2006) . For the United States, North (1987) concludes that the implementation of the naturalization procedures vary a great deal between district o¢ ces. Helbling and Kriesi (2004) and Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) reveal striking di¤erences among municipalities in Switzerland. And even notoriously centralized states like France do not seem to be immune from distinct implementations of its national law (Weil, 2004) .
The Swiss case lends itself particularly well for empirical research on naturalizations because the political system is characterized by a emphatic devotion to federalism and subsidiarity. Helbling (2008) and Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) First, the right to appeal rejected applications was not ensured. Closed ballots, by de…-nition, lack the basis for any contestable justi…cation. Second, the court disapproved of the severe lack of privacy in the evaluation of the applicants, who had to reveal detailed background information to all eligible voters, usually in form of detailed lea ‡ets (the very information that was harnessed for research). Hainmueller and Hangartner show that the switch to elected councils increased the naturalization rates of the formerly discriminated applicants on average by 50%, more so in municipalities with a high vote share of the conservative Swiss People's Party (SVP), and even in municipalities that did not switch their naturalization regime. This is interpreted as evidence of discrimination on the assumption that once accountable legislators instead of anonymous voters are in charge of handling naturalizations, indulgence of discriminatory preferences become more costly and thus less likely.
Heterogeneity in strictness in the application of the law are a widespread feature of naturalization policies. In the next section I advance a model that exploits these variations to develop a test for prejudice. The model is based on the premise that in screening their applicants, councils take into consideration any signals that are informative of actual quali…cation for citizenship. Chiswick and Miller (2008) suggest that individual-level characteristics systematically relate to citizenship status. Duration of residence, command of the host country's o¢ cial language, and, to some extent, higher levels of skill (indexed by education attainment and occupation), all link to naturalization, although Dronkers and Vink (2012) put the role of skill in perspective. The highest explanatory power for naturalization according to Chiswick and Miller are country of origin characteristics, even more so than individual characteristics. This is in accord with Dronkers and Vink (2012) and DeVoretz and Pivnenko (2005) , who show that immigrants from poor or politically unstable countries are more likely to naturalize. My model assumes that deciding councils condense this individual and group information into an index of expected eligibility.
A Model of Naturalization Decisions

The Model
Consider two councils that separately evaluate their resident immigrants which apply for naturalization. Let c 2 fA; Bg denote the councils. In each council, there are continuums of applicants grouped into country of origin e 2 fR; F g, where R and F stand for related and foreign, respectively. 7 Suppose that among applicants of origin e, a fraction e is objectively unquali…ed for naturalization. I allow for the possibility that the unobservable characteristics among applicants from di¤erent countries of origin may di¤er. Councils therefore evaluate the merit for naturalization based on the applicant's origin and a myriad of observable applicant characteristics. A council may consider information such as gender, age, number of children, language skills, familiarity with local habits and law, duration of residence, employment status, or level of education and income. Importantly, a council also processes characteristics that are di¢ cult to observe for a researcher, such as demeanor or congeniality during personal interviews. Let us assume that a council condenses all this information into a one-dimensional index 2 [0; 1] which re ‡ects the likelihood that an applicant is unquali…ed for naturalization. This index is randomly 7 The model readily extends to n councils and m immigrant groups.
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drawn from a continuous density function f e u ( ) if the applicant is actually unquali…ed.
If the applicant is quali…ed, the index is drawn from f e q ( ). For this index to be indicative of quali…cation, the two densities are assumed to satisfy the strict monotone likelihood ratio property, that is, for e 2 fR; F g, f to prefer applicants of certain origin to be naturalized (or conversely, dislike applicants of certain origin to become citizens). Based on this taste, a given council whose bene…t depends on the applicant's country of origin is said to be prejudiced:
On the other hand, councils may derive di¤erent levels of bene…t in general from naturalizing quali…ed applicants, levels that do not depend on country of origin. Such di¤erences in bene…ts could stem, for instance, from varying identity preferences based on group distinction or high council standards associated with the merit of citizenship.
De…ne councils to be heterogenous if b(A; e) 6 = b(B; e)
8 For the sake of simplicity, I assume t to be independent of council and country of origin.
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for some e. Councils that derive little bene…t from naturalization are said to be strict.
Likewise, councils that derive a lot of bene…t are said to be lenient. It is easy to see that heterogenous councils do not imply prejudice against a given country of origin. By the same token, homogenous councils do not imply the lack of prejudice as both councils might equally prefer or dislike applicants from certain backgrounds.
Theoretical Implications
Denote by U the undesirable event that a naturalized applicant turns out to be unquali…ed. The probability of this event depends both on the signal observed during the interview and on country of origin. Following Bayes'rule, this probability is given by
The monotone likelihood ratio property implies that this probability strictly increases in . Since the signal is informative, a higher level correctly re ‡ects an increase in the mistake probability. Now consider the decision problem of a council faced with this information:
max fb(c; e) [1 Pr(U j e; )] t Pr(U j e; ); 0g
The …rst term describes the expected bene…t from naturalizing a quali…ed applicant minus the cost of mistakenly naturalizing an unquali…ed applicant. Not naturalizing yields a bene…t of zero. The costs associated with the naturalization process itself are considered …xed and are thus disregarded. Thus, the council does best to naturalize if and only if
in words, whenever the expected bene…t of naturalizing outweighs the expected cost.
This naturalization condition reduces to
Pr(U j e; ) < b(c; e) b(c; e) + t
Intuitively, a high bene…t of naturalization makes for a riskier behavior because the council accepts a higher probability of mistakes. On the other hand, high costs of making mistakes do not leave a lot of room for suspicious signals. Because Pr(U j e; ) is strictly increasing in , the naturalization condition described by (2) implies that the council grants citizenship if and only if
where the naturalization threshold (c; e) is pinned down by Pr(U j e; (c; e)) = b(c; e) b(c; e) + t .
The applicant sending the signal (c; e) is called the marginal applicant who is deemed just worthy enough to be granted citizenship. Any applicant with a higher signal than this standard will be rejected. Likewise, any applicant with a lower signal will be naturalized. It is straightforward to see that (c; e) is strictly increasing in b(c; e) and strictly decreasing in t. The higher the bene…t of naturalization, the worse the quali…cation standard is allowed to become. In turn, higher costs imply a stricter expected quality conveyed by the signal. The signal threshold (c; e) determines the average rejection rate of council c against applicants of origin e in equilibrium:
This rejection rate is monotonically decreasing in (c; e): The worse the signal is allowed to become, the less applicants are rejected. Note that a council that is not prejudiced 13 might neverthelesss use di¤erent signal thresholds for the applicant groups. An unprejudiced council does not aim to set equal signal thresholds but equal probabilities of quali…cation for the marginal applicants. If one applicant group is known to have a larger unquali…ed fraction or if the signal is distributed di¤erently between the two applicant groups, councils take this information into account. This implication is an inherent part of models of statistical discrimination. Equation (1) illustrates that because the applicant's quali…cation is not perfectly observed, a council's optimal assessment about the quali…cation of a given applicant does not solely depend on that applicant's signal. The assessment also considers the fraction of quali…ed applicants in that group. Also note that if councils are homogenous they all derive the same bene…t from a given applicant group. In that case, the threshold condition (3) implies that unbiased councils set the same signal threshold for this group. Consequently, the rejection rate de…ned by (4) against this particular applicant group would be the same for both councils. and r(A; F ) < r(B; F ). The rejection rates of the lenient council A will be lower for both applicant groups. To sum up, if councils are heterogenous but not prejudiced, the ranking of the rejection rates across councils does not depend on country of origin. If this rank order is violated, we can deduce relative prejudice among the councils. However, because there is no objective rank order that de…nes impartiality, one cannot pinpoint the discriminating council.
An Outcome Test for Prejudice in Naturalization Decisions
The model provides a test for prejudice that is applicable with average outcome data.
This test can be implemented even when researchers have no access to the signals which are observed by the councils when deciding whether to grant citizenship. The theoretical implications predict that under the null hypothesis of no relative prejudice among the councils, the rank order of the average rejection rates for a given country of origin e across councils c 2 fA; Bg does not depend on country of origin e 2 fR; F g. Heterogeneity across councils is thus a prerequisite for the empirical application of the test.
Discussing the Model
Outcome tests have notorious issues with infra-marginality. Generally one cannot infer disparate treatment from (average) outcome data. Instead, it is the outcome of marginal decisionmaking that is informative of animus. 9 It is useful to elaborate on this distinction. Recall that the councils only naturalize applicants with a signal that is below the naturalization threshold (3) for that group. In other words, a council only naturalizes applicants who are deemed quali…ed enough. If a council is not biased, at the margin it requires the same probability of quali…cation no matter the country of origin. But we know that depending on the group-speci…c distributions of the signals and the fraction of unquali…ed applicants in that group, the average rejection rates may vary despite the same marginal decisionmaking process. Since empirical data only provides information on average outcomes, the infra-marginality issue poses a key obstacle for inferences of disparate treatment via outcome data.
9 For a extended description of this issue see Becker (1993) , Yinger (1996) , or Ayres (2002) .
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The proposed outcome test in this paper circumvents this issue. The test does not directly compare the average rejection rates for a given country of origin across councils.
Instead, it makes use of the rankings implied by the model, an indirect identi…cation strategy so to speak. These rankings exploit the simple fact that under the model assumptions, the direction in which the average rejection rate moves is unambiguously determined by the direction in which the council adjusts the required marginal probability of quali…cation. A higher (lower) marginal probability of quali…cation always implies a higher (lower) average rejection rate. Put simply, the average moves with the marginal because they are strictly monotonically related. So although we cannot infer directly if the required marginal probabilites of quali…cation are equal when looking at the average rejection rates, we do know which rank order of the average rejection rates would reject the hypothesis that the marginal probabilities are equal.
This identi…cation strategy bears a caveat. Like in Anwar and Fang's (2006) test
for racial prejudice in motor vehicle searches, there is some leeway of prejudice in the average rejection rates due to the ordinal nature of the test. Imagine that one council is prejudiced against applicants from a certain country of origin, which raises the rejection rate. But the proposed test will fail to detect prejudice if this rate remains within the allowed range which is consistent with the null hypothesis of an independent rank order across councils. This is the case if the prejudice is not too strong, where strong is relative and depends on the magnitude of prejudice required for a violation of the rank orders and on the di¤erences in bene…t across councils. The larger these di¤erences, the more leeway there is. In statistical terms, there is a high probability of a type-II error, not rejecting the null hypothesis of no prejudice. All the same, if the test does indicate prejudice, it does so with high con…dence.
There also looms an empirical issue. The tests assumes that all councils face pools of applicants which are sampled from the same population. This assumption may not hold. For instance, if one municipality attracts particularly high-skilled immigrants from Turkey, rejection rates in that municipality may be lower because of the higher eligibility, not because its council is more lenient. In the case study below, my identi…cation strategy circumvents this pitfall by testing within municipalities over time. The sudden change of the naturalization regime in 2003 mandated by the Swiss Federal Court ensures that councils face pools of applicants which are sampled from the very same population.
Because a naturalization application takes at least two years to go through, applicants could not have anticipated the regime change, so any observable changes in rejection rates cannot be explained by a change in the application pool prior to the ruling.
Data
There are a lot of municipalities in Switzerland, and most of them are small. In 2016, with a population count of 8 million residents, there were 2'294 municipalities in Switzerland.
The mean municipality had 3'600 residents, the median municipality had 1'400 residents. 
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Note: To preserve anonymity, the letters in the parentheses denote the categories within which the corresponding number of observations falls: a (no observation), b (1-10 observations), c (11-30), d (> 30). Table 1 shows, in percent, the rejection rates for the six municipalities A to F for the years 1998 to 2011, classi…ed by applicant group. For example, in municipality B in 2002 applicants from Yugoslavia were rejected at a rate of 23 percent. Figure A1 in the appendix and, by taking two examples, Figure 1 and 2 visualize these data. Table   2 con ‡ates, for each applicant group and municipality, the combined rejection rates for entire period. For example, from 1998-2011 applications from the southern European group in municipality E got rejected at a rate of six percent. Taken together, in the six municipalities 1,516 out of 11,345 applications, or roughly 13%, were rejected during the 14 years of observation. The municipalities di¤er in their number of applications.
Municipality E has the highest number of observations with over 5,000 recorded applications, accounting for almost half of the observations in the data set. Municipality A has less than 600 observations. By and large, Yugoslavians and Turks apply in greater numbers than the two European groups. Their rates are di¤erent, too. Turks and Yugoslavians typically exhibit the highest rejection rates, broadly ranging from 10% to 40% over the years, with Yugoslavians consistently being rejected at a higher rate. Applicants from the northwestern European group usually do not have to fear rejections, except in municipality E, where they even join the ranks of the Yugoslavian rates. Because municipality E also provides the highest number of observations in the data set, the aggregated rejection rates over all municipalities for the northwestern group is higher than for the southern group. In general, however, the southern group is situated slightly above the northwestern group on an annual basis in the other municipalities. There seems to be another overarching ranking pattern in the rejection rates. There seems to be heterogeneity between municipalities, too. Across the board, municipality F does not reject often.
Municipality D, in contrast, seems to be more restrictive in general. This dovetails with the conclusions from Section 2. All Applicants 32 11 15 17 11 9 13 
Empirical Analysis
The decision by the courts in 2003 made local naturalization practices the center of public attention. Municipalities, now under close scrutiny, suddenly risked sharp criticism for the handling of their naturalization applications. Rejecting applicants became more risky. In terms of the model, the cost of mistakenly naturalizing unquali…ed applicants decreased. In equation (2), this exogenous shock raised the signal threshold (c; e) and thus decreased the average rejection rate in equation (4). In turn, this implies an increase in the naturalization rate, a hypothesis supported by the …ndings in Hainmueller and Hangartner (2017) . Against that background, the test for prejudice proposed in Section 3.3 predicts that if a municipality is unprejudiced, the exogenous shock should not change the ranking of its rejection rates by applicant group.
I …rst test whether there is a statistically signi…cant break in rejection rates upon the decision of the courts. To that end, for each applicant group in every municipality I calculate the aggregate rejection rates from 1998 -2002 -2006 , respectively. After 2007 , the number of applications began to rise, which could indicate a change of quality 22 in the pool of applicants. As in Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) and Anwar and Fang (2006) , aggregating over time increases the number of observations for the empirical test to a su¢ cient frequency. Both the number of applications and the rejection rates are stable within these respective periods, which increases our con…dence that there are no changes in the quality of the applicant pools that could be confounding the results.
I refrain from a using parametric test, which is only valid if the systematic component The …fth and and tenth column in Table 3 , "p-value", show the levels of statistical signi…cance from this test. Except in municipality E, I drop the northern group from the tests because of its low frequencies. In all tested cases, the rates decreased or remained constant after the break. The null is rejected in 11 out of 19 tests, suggesting that, by and large, the rejection rates decreased signi…cantly during the three years after the ruling.
For each municipality, I proceed to test for statistically signi…cant rankings between the applicant groups before and after the break, respectively. For these rank tests, I also employ the non-parametric Pearson 2 test of independence. In Table 3 , the subpanels Table 3 rejects the null for all three pairwise comparisons of the applicant groups in both periods. On the basis of the conceptual framework outlined in Section 3 we therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis of no prejudice in municipality D. Table 3 shows that the rejection rate among applicants from Yugoslavia amounted to 42% before the break, only to drop to 5% afterwards. The
Turkish rejection rate dropped as well, from 24% to 17%, but not enough to make up the sharp descent of the Yugoslavian rate. This rank reversal is statistically signi…cant.
The empirical test rejects the null that the rejections rates are equal before the break (after the break) at a one percent (…ve percent) level of signi…cance. On that account, using the model we can conclude that, in this data set, there is evidence of prejudice in municipality C.
In a cross-sectional comparison of municipalities, we would neither be able to pinpoint the responsible municipality nor the discriminated applicant group. For the test for prejudice is a relative one, able to detect empirical patterns that are inconsistent with the assumption of unprejudiced municipalities. The within-municipality comparison upon the ruling of the courts overcomes both issues. The responsible municipality is obvious.
And because the ruling raised the costs of prejudice, it is straightforward that, within the context of the model, municipality C used to be prejudiced against applicants from Yugoslavia before 2003.
The empirical results from the other municipalities do not point towards prejudice.
Municipality A is an outlier in this analysis. The 2003 ruling brought practically brought about a complete reversal of the rejection rates, from all out to all in. But the data fail to provide a generally distinguishable rank order. Municipality B reveals an evident break only for the Yugoslavian rates, which consistently rank higher than the southern rates. In municipality E, we can conclude breaks for both the Yugoslavian and southern rate and can di¤erentiate a combined rank order: Yugoslavian and northwestern applicants rank higher than Turkish and southern applicants in both periods. Finally, the Yugoslavian rate in municipality F ranks highest throughout. The Turkish rate hovers between the Yugoslavian one and the southern one, the latter being zero in every year. Although rankable, none of them reveal a statistically signi…cant break in 2003. Finally, the overall pattern of the data after the break displays a positive relationship between the number of applications and the rejection rate. Some years after the court ruling, more and more immigrants expressed interest in the Swiss passport. As the number of applications rose, the rejection rate increased, too. This …nding accords with the prediction of the model. The expansion of the applicant pool entailed a reduction in quality at the margin. With a …xed signal threshold for naturalization, this change implies a rise in the rejection rate. At the same time, it implies a rise in the naturalization rate; an implication which is consistent with the …ndings in Hainmueller and Hangartner (2017) .
Conclusion
This paper proposes and empirically implements a test for prejudice in naturalizations based on a theoretical model of regionally deciding councils. The model uses rejection rates, classi…ed by applicant group, as an indicator of prejudice. The test assesses the hypothesis that applicants striving for citizenship in their administrative division are measured by the same local yardstick. Using Switzerland as a case study, I collect an original data set on rejection rates from six large municipalities and exploit a landmark ruling in naturalization law in 2003, a ruling that exogenously raised the costs of rejecting applicants. According to the test, there is bias against applicants from former Yugoslavia in one of the six municipalities. In the other …ve, the test cannot reject the hypothesis of no prejudice. In addition, I provide empirical evidence consistent with a testable implication of the model, lending credibility to its descriptive validity.
One drawback in the existing research on naturalization is a lack of understanding about the mechanism driving the naturalization decision. That process has been looked on as a black box. My model aims to provide a generalizable comprehension of how rejection outcomes, and hence successful naturalizations, might be determined from the behavior of the deciding councils. The inference of eligibility for naturalization can take many forms, some of which are likely not observable to researchers. The implication is that even strong disparities in rejection rates when controlled for observable character-28 istics may not prove prejudice. In contrast to a simple empirical analysis, the model helps understand how the observed outcomes have come about and provides a frame to interpret these data.
This may shed new light on existing conclusions of naturalization outcomes. Hainmueller and Hangartner (2017), for example, attribute the rise in naturalization rates in Switzerland after the 2003 ruling to discriminatory preferences by the the previous electorate. This conclusion emanates from the observation that for Turkish and former
Yugoslavian applicants, the spike in naturalization rates was more pronounced in municipalites where the conservative Swiss People's Party (SVP) has higher vote shares. The model developped in this paper illustrates that this share might not necessarily be a "good proxy for xenophobic preferences" (p.12), preferences which manifest in the indulgence of prejudiced behavior against immigrants. Instead, the share could re ‡ect a universally conservative state of mind. Just as one would hesitate to conclude that countries which are more reluctant to naturalize immigrants are prejudiced, the model allows for di¤erent levels of unprejudiced strictness among regions within a country. In the model this would imply that decisionmakers lower their required standard of quali…cation due to the increase in looming public accusation of prejudice. Because the conservative municipalites lower their bars from higher levels, they start letting through marginalized applicant groups at a higher rate than lenient municipalities, where the bulk of marginalized applicants had already cleared the bars. Other applicant groups would be less a¤ected overall because their higher eligibility was never a real issue even in conservative municipalities.
In this sense, this paper proposes an unprejudiced mechanism that is consistent with the same evidence.
In cross-sectional empirical implementations of the model, councils are not necessarily facing identical applicant pools. Researchers thus need to empirically verify that on average the pools of applicants faced by the di¤erent decisionmaking bodies are the same. This assumption could be ensured by testing variables that proxy for eligibility.
For example, data from the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) would help answering the question whether students of a given country of origin have equal educational skill sets in di¤erent regions. Labor force survey or household panel data could be also used to verify similar eligibility.
I would also like to emphasize that, like in any empirical analysis with observational data, the test for prejudice proposed in this paper is only valid under certain assumptions.
For example, in the model applicants do not interact strategically with the councils.
One might object that the council's beliefs about the applicants might disincentivize marginalized groups to invest in integrational capital in the …rst place. Such models of self-ful…lling prophecy have been discussed by Arrow (1973) and Coate and Loury (1993) .
This is a limitation of this study. In ongoing research I address such an extension and
show that under certain conditions, multiple equilibria may arise in which the branch of rank order tests to which my test belongs may not be valid (Ilić, 2016) .
Finally, the conclusions about prejudice in this empirical analysis should be treated with mindful caution. The empirical data are novel and were raised manually, thus lacking rigorous validation and standardization. My hope is that the approach used in this paper 
